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Cockreham: Miranda and Misdemeanors

COMMENTS
MIRANDA AND MISDEMEANORS
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona,' the landmark fifth amendment case whose
holding 2 safeguarding the privilege against self-incrimination has become as well-known as the alphabet to television
crime show enthusiasts. The rules announced in Miranda
have figured in a myriad of lower court decisions,' while innumerable commentators have expressed their views on the
decision.
Although Miranda and its companion cases were felony
prosecutions, the decision was based on the fifth amendment, which makes no distinction between felonies and misdemeanors.4 Moreover, the holding of Miranda was expressed in general terms' after the Court had stated the purpose of Miranda as that of providing broad constitutional
mandates.6

Disregarding the Court's purpose, a number of lower
courts have determined that the Mirandarules do not apply
to violations of motor vehicle laws,7 and some courts have
gone as far as to extend its inapplicability to all misdemeanors.' Consequently in those jurisdictions, the standard
Copyright ©1979 by the University of Wyoming.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Miranda requires procedural safeguards to be employed when an individual "has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444.
Unless the accused chooses to speak after having been informed "that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed," Id., any statement he makes in response to questioning may not be used
by the prosecution.
3. Some indication of the number of cases affected by Mirandais given by the twenty-

five pages of citations to the case in

4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS

through

October, 1978.
The fifth amendment provides, in part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself..."
"[Wihen an individual is... deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is
jeopardized." Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 478.
"We granted certiorari in these cases.., in order further to explore some facets of
the problems, thus exposed, of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to
in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." Id. at 441-2.
Clay v. Riddle, 541 F2d 456 (4th Cir. 1976); State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972);
State v. Beasley, 10 N.C.App. 663, 179 S.E.2d 820 (N.C.Ct.App. 1971); State v.
Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970); State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d 848 (Del. Supr. Ct.
1968); People v. Bliss, 53 Misc.2d 472, 278 N.Y.S.2d 732 JAllegheny Co. Ct. 1967).
State v. Gabrielson, 192 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1971); State v. Angelo, 251 La. 250, 203
So.2d 710 (1967); State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St.2d 64, 249 N.E. 2d 826 (1969), cert. den.
396 U.S. 1007 (1970).
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for determining the admissibility of the defendant's statement is the voluntariness test applicable in criminal cases
before Miranda.9
This discussion will briefly review the voluntariness
standard, applicable where a court avoids Miranda's mandates, and will then examine Miranda's applicability to
minor offenses. The theory underlying this discussion is that
the decisions holding Miranda'srules inapplicable to misdemeanors'" are based on a superficial reading of the opinion
and, as such, should not be followed.
THE PRE-MIRANDA VOLUNTARINESS STANDARD

Concepts of voluntariness have evolved over time. At
first, judicial interest centered on the trustworthiness of the
confession. A confession was admissible as long as it was
free of influence which made it untrustworthy or unreliable.
Because of the Court's fear that a confession was motivated,
not by guilt, but by the desire to avoid pain or to secure some
favor, independent corroboration was necessary before a
confession was admissible."
The "untrustworthiness" rationale explains the exclusion of the confession in Brown v. Mississippi,2 the first confession case predicated upon the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Although Brown held as violative of
the fourteenth amendment a conviction resting "solely"
upon a confession extorted by brutality and violence, 3 it
soon became clear that due process was violated by the pro9.

The traditional tests of voluntariness of confessions are not completely dead, but
Miranda has superimposed upon those tests procedural safeguards which must be
satisfied before the question of voluntariness can be considered.
Also, when no interrogation has taken place, a statement given voluntarily
may still be admitted. People v. Mercer, 257 Cal. App. 2d 244, 64 Cal. Rptr. 861 (Ct.
App. 1967).
Further, statements made voluntarily may be available to impeach even if not
admissible as direct evidence. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). For a discussion of the voluntariness standard in Wyoming, see 11 LAND & WATEa L. REV. 277,
286 (1976).
10. There is variation among jurisdictions as to distinctions between felony and misdemeanor. For example, Wyoming distinguishes the two in terms of place of incarceration. See Wyo. Stat. § 6-1-102 (1977). Other states classify the crimes according to
length of incarceration. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.02(D), (EJ (1978).
The term misdemeanor will be used in this discussion to refer to the less serious
offenses in any jurisdiction.
11. See, Isaacs v. U.S., 159 U.S. 487 (1895), see generally, MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 147
(2d. ed. 1972).
12. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
13. The deputy who presided over the beating of the defendant conceded that orie
prisoner had been whipped "not too much for a Negro."
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secution's mere use of an involuntary confession. The Court
became less concerned with the reliability of the confession
and more with coercive police methods which might cause
the confession to be involuntary. The Court recognized that
psychological as well as physical impact of interrogation
involuntary even in the
techniques often render a statement
14
absence of physical abuse.
By using the voluntariness test the Court engaged in a
case-by-case scrutiny of the "totality of circumstances" surrounding the statements. Such factors as the accused's
age, 5 intelligence,1 6 the conditions under which the interrogation took place,17 the physical and mental condition of
the accused,18 inducements used to persuade the accused to
confess,' 9 and whether warnings were given the accused"
were considered. If a confession was not the "product of a rational intellect and a free will,"21 it was not admissible.
Few guidelines emerged from the case-by-case approach,
and local courts nearly always resolved the cases in favor of
admissibility of the incriminating statement. 22 The defendants' only recourse was appeal and this avenue was not
available to most. As Justice Black remarked, in the course
of oral arguments in Miranda, "[Iff you are going to determine [the admissibility of a confession] each time on the circumstances, [if] this Court will take them one by one.., it is
more than we are capable of doing."2
The first significant step away from sole reliance on the
voluntariness test was taken in Escobedo v. Illinois,2 4 where
the Court held inadmissible incriminating statements made
after the accused had requested and been denied counsel.
Although the decision was based on the sixth amendment
14.

See, Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); where the police, despite the

15.

absence of "one single tangible clue pointing to his guilt,' had interrogated
Ashcraft for thirty-six hours, during which time he had been held incommunicado
without sleep or rest. The Court found the situation to be "inherently coercive."
See, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) a fifteen year old boy.

16.

See, Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) a nineteen year old "'near mental defec-

tive."
17.

See, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) continued and coercive interrogation.

18. See, Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) mentally ill defendant.
19. See, Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) woman persuaded to confess so that her
children would not be taken from her.
20. See, Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
21. Blackburn v. Alabama, supra note 18, at 208.
KAMISAR, LAFAVE, ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 513 (4th ed. 1974).
22.
23. Id24. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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right to counsel,2 5 the Court implicitly recognized a fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination at the interrogation stage. 6
Two years later came Miranda v. Arizona, 7 which explicitly relied on the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination. The Court attempted to establish a clear-cut
test of admissibility of confessions to obviate the uncertainties and difficulties that arose in applying the voluntariness
test. Failure to follow the Miranda procedures renders any
statement inadmissible at trial regardless of its volun28
tariness.
SCOPE OF MIRANDA

"One might wish to criticize the Miranda opinion for its
far-ranging 'guidebook' format. But, rightly or wrongly, that
opinion is what it is." 2 9 There is no language in Miranda
which shows the Court did not intend its decision to apply to
both felonies and misdemeanors. In fact, Chief Justice Warren's opening statement tends to refute a contrary belief:
"The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of
our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal
Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime."' The
term "crime" encompasses both felonies and misdemean3 t
ors.
The requirement of apprising an individual of his fifth
amendment protections does not hinge on the degree of seriousness of the crime. Rather, the individual must be informed of his rights whenever the "privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized." 2 The privilege is jeopardized "when
an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.

Id. at 490-91.
Id. at 488: "Our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of the
right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against selfincrimination."
Supra, note 1.
See, Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 471-72.
Dershowitz and Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L. J. 1198, 1210 (1971).
Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 439 (emphasis added).
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY notes that " 'crime' and 'misdemeanor,' properly speaking, are synonymous terms.... [C]rime [is] a term of broad and general import, including both felonies and misdemeanors, and hence covering all infractions of the
criminal law."
Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 478.
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his freedom by authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning."33 Thus, a court's attention should be
focused on the question of whether the suspect was in
custody, rather than whether a felony or misdemeanor was
committed. The need for giving Miranda warnings should be
determined by the nature of the interrogation, not by the
nature of the offense. 3 Both Arizona 3 and California 6 have

recognized the question of custody as the issue involved in a
fifth amendment case, be it felony or misdemeanor.3 7 In People v. Ceconne," the California court recognized, in a misdemeanor case, that "Mirandapermits no questioning without
a prior warning once the suspect is in custody.""
PRO-MIRANDA MISDEMEANOR DECISIONS

Well-reasoned cases have applied Miranda to misdemeanors. Perhaps the clearest explanation is given in the
Arizona case of State v. Tellez: "' "The language of the Miranda case applies its rules to all crimes.... Those accused of
either a felony or a misdemeanor are entitled to the warnings
4
of constitutional rights." '

The Pennsylvania court has also held Miranda applicable to misdemeanors, reasoning:
Despite the fact that Miranda itself, as well as a
great bulk of decisions following it have been felony
prosecutions, there is no indication that one accused
of a misdemeanor... must subject himself to police
interrogation absent the fundamental safeguards
afforded others. 2
In the same vein, the Ohio court, in speaking of a defendant charged with driving while intoxicated, expressed no
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id
Clay v. Riddle, supra note 7, at 459 (dissenting opinion).
See Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542,479 P.2d 685 (1971); State v. Tellez, 6
Ariz. App. 251, 431 P.2d 691 (1967).
See, People v. Ceconne, 260 Cal. App.2d 937, 67 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1968).
The question of what constitutes custodial interrogation is beyond the scope of this
discussion. Suffice it to say, again, that the determination of whether the suspect
was in custody should be the focal point of any fifth amendment self-incrimination
case.
Supra note 35.
People v. Ceconne, supra note 35, at 503.
Supra note 35.
State v. Tellez, supra note 35, at 695.
Commonwealth v. Bonser, 215 Pa. Super. 452, 258 A.2d 675, 679 (1969) where the
defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated, was taken to the police station where he made incriminating statements.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1979

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 14 [1979], Iss. 2, Art. 6

526

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIV

sympathy for the defendant noting that traffic offenses are
very serious crimes.
But, [the court said], the defendant is not a criminal
in the usual sense. His occupation is that of a paper
hanger, and he should be entitled, at least, to the
same constitutional protections afforded daily to
hardened criminals.43
These cases clearly have recognized Miranda's mandates and have observed the restraints "consistent with the
Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime.""'
ANTI-MIRANDA MISDEMEANOR DECISIONS

Disregarding the apparent constitutional mandates set
forth in Miranda, several courts45 have held Miranda inapplicable to misdemeanors. This discussion turns now to the
rationales of those decisions. At lease five different reasons
have been employed for failing to apply Miranda to misdemeanors.
Undue Interference With Law Enforcement
Some courts4 6 have purported to find support for deciding upon Miranda's inapplicability in the words of Miranda
itself where the Court noted: "The limits we have placed on
the interrogation process should not constitute an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement. '4 7 For
instance the Iowa court interpreted this language as authorizing law enforcement officials to disregard the constitutional warnings when to follow them would "constitute an
undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement,4" [and, the court continued,] to hold Mirandawarnings
applicable to simple misdemeanors would unduly interfere." 49
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

City of Piqua v. Hinger, 13 Ohio App.2d 108, 112, 234 N.E.2d 321, 324 (1967), rev'd
on othergrounds, 15 Ohio St.2d 110, 238 N.E.2d 766 (1968), cert. den., 393 U.S. 1001
(1968).
Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 439.
Supra notes 7 and 8.
State v. Gabrielson, supra note 8; State v. Angelo, supra note 8; State v. Macuk,
supra note 7; State v. Pyle, supra note 8.
Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 481.
State v. Gabrielson, supranote 8, at 795; accord State v. Pyle, supra note 8, at 67-68,
828.
State v. Gabrielson, supra note 8, at 796.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss2/6

6

Cockreham: Miranda and Misdemeanors

1979

COMMENTS

527

By focusing upon this isolated passage, the Iowa court
seems to have misinterpreted the language. More reasonably, this passage 0 was an expression of the Court's belief
that requiring compliance with the Mirandarules will not interfere with proper law enforcement. Further, the warnings
are easily given and the procedures for giving them have
become routinized, with the suspect generally being given a
printed notice of rights with a waiver form attached."
Moreover, there is evidence that applying Miranda's
rules does not have a crippling effect upon law enforcement.
A study made by a group at Yale Law School as to the workings of the Miranda rule at the New Haven, Connecticut
police station during an eleven month period in the summer
of 1966 concluded, "that warnings had little impact on suspects' behavior. No support was found for the claim that
warnings reduce the amount of 'talking.' "I'
Besides the warnings have been constitutionally mandated by Miranda so they ought be given, despite any imagined interference with law enforcement. As the Miranda
Court observed:
The Fifth Amendment is so fundamental to our
system of constitutional rule and the expedient of
giving an adequate warning... so simple ... [that] a
warning at the time of interrogation is indispensable. 3
Miranda Was a Felony
Miranda v. Arizona and its companion cases5 4 were
felony prosecutions for kidnapping and rape, first degree
robbery, bank robbery, and first degree murder., In deciding
whether the Miranda holding extends to those persons accused of misdemeanors, as well as felonies, some courts have
adhered "to the accepted principle that any court-made rule
of law must be read in relation to the facts which precipitated it." 55
50. See, text accompanying note 46.
51. Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47
DENVER L. J. 1,9 (1970).

Project, Interrogationsin New Haven; The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L. J. 1519,
1563 (1967).
53. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 468-9.
54. Vignera v. New York; Westover v. U.S.; California v. Stewart.
55. State v. Pyle, supra note 8, at 827, accord State v. Gabrielson, State v. Angelo,
52.

supra note 8.
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While it may be technically accurate to say that Miranda applies only to felony cases since only felony cases were
before the Court, the Mirandaholding did not purport to be
limited to its facts.56 "The fact that a felony was involved in
Miranda... does not give rise to an inference that the thrust
of that decision goes to felonies only." 57 The dissenting judge

in State v. Pyle, recognizing Miranda as premised upon the
privilege against self-incrimination, logically reasoned:
It is inconsistent to hold that the Miranda warning
aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination is
not applicable to misdemeanors, while no suggestion is made that the other judicial interpretations
concerning the privilege against self-incrimination
are not applicable to misdemeanors. A defendant
charged with a misdemeanor could never be compelled to take the witness stand, or, if he testified
could he ever be compelled to give an answer incriminating himself, nor could the prosecution comment on such a defendant's failure to testify. 8
The privilege against self-incrimination should not divisible
merely because fragmenting the privilege might be convenient for the lower courts.
Insufficient Number of Lawyers
In holding Miranda inapplicable to motor vehicle violations, the New Jersey court in State v. Macuk59 and the
Missouri court in State v. Neal0 postulated that it would be
utterly impossible to provide sufficient lawyers to consult
with the number of motor vehicle operators who would request legal advise.
Statistical evidence is contrary to the courts' speculation. The Yale Law School Study61 found in only a few cases
did the warnings cause suspects to ask for counsel, even
though felonies and serious misdemeanors were involved.
"Our findings suggest Miranda will rarely bring lawyers to
the stationhouse. Defendants, told of their right to counsel,
56. See text accompanying notes 4, 30, and 42.
57. State v.Pyle, supra note 8, at 829 (dissenting opinion).
58. Id.
59. Supra note 7.
60. Supra note 7.
61. Supra note 52.
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usually neglect the offer and let interrogation proceed.''6
From June 1966 to June 1977, the Junior Bar Association of
the District of Columbia and the Neighborhood Legal Services Project set up a program to provide around-the-clock
availability of counsel for defendants. In that year, only
seven percent of those arrested for felonies and serious
misdemeanors requested counsel from the Project.6 3
Even if it were true that police are swamped with requests for counsel, this is certainly not a compelling reason
for failing to hold Miranda applicable to all crimes. Miranda,
premised on the fifth amendment, applies to any criminal
proceeding.6 4 Further, the "lack-of-lawyers" argument used
to avoid Miranda'srequirements in misdemeanor cases has
been largely mooted by the Supreme Court in Argersingerv.
Hamlin,6 5 where the Court extended the sixth amendment
right to appointed counsel to all cases in which imprisonment will be imposed. In other words, a defendant may not
be imprisoned, no matter how minor the offense, unless he
has been offered counsel to defend him at trial. 6 A misdemeanant often faces the possibility of imprisonment. 7
Therefore, in order to safeguard the court's option to impose
a jail sentence, the suspect must be informed of his right to
counsel.
Acceptable Investigatory Tactics
Several cases have tried to distinguish Mirandaby arguing that it was concerned with preventing lengthy, incommunicado interrogation seeking to "sweat out" confessions
which is unlikely to occur in misdemeanor investigations.
Thus, the argument continues, Miranda does not apply.6 8
Again, these decisions ignore Miranda'sguidebook format. The Supreme Court emphasized that Miranda's principles were not limited to the "third degree": "Even without
employing brutality [or] the 'third degree'.., the very fact of
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 1600.
Medalie, Zeitz, Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's CapitaL
The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MicH. L. REv. 1347 (1968).
Supra note 4.
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
Id. at 37.
See, WYo. STAT. § 6-1-107 (1977).
State v. Macuk; State v. Neal, supra note 7; State v. Pyle; State v. Gabrielson, supra
note 8.
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custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual
liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals. '6 The
rules announced in Mirandaare to assure that the decision to
speak is intelligently made, and is not aimed only at preventing overzealous interrogation of suspected felons.
Harmless Error
Some cases rejecting Miranda's applicability to misdemeanors dealt with statements that might well have been admissible under Miranda. In State v. Macuk7 0 and State v.
Bliss,7 ' each court coupled its rejection of the Miranda requirements with the observation that the admission of the
defendant's statement was probably harmless error. In
Macuk, the court noted that the interrogation conducted
without benefit of Miranda warnings "produced no more inculpatory information than had the previous permissible onthe-scene investigatory inquiries." 2 The defendant in Bliss,
the court noted, suffered no harm from the failure to tell him
about availability of appointed counsel."3 Likewise the Louisiana court74 preferred to state broadly that Miranda does
not apply to misdemeanors, rather than base the admissibility of the incriminating statement on the absence of custodial
interrogation.
In view of these factors, the declarations of these
courts
that Miranda does not apply to misdemeanors are, at best,
alternative holdings and, as such, "their precedential value
is limited."7 5
CONCLUSION

Opinions which have determined that the Miranda requirements are inapplicable to misdemeanors are unconvincing. Miranda states rules which apply in all criminal cases.
"A system that treats defendants who are charged with
minor offenses with less dignity than it treats those who are
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1,at 455-56.
Supra note 7.
Supra note 7.
State v. Macuk, supra note 7, at 9.
State v. Bliss, supra note 7.
State v. Angelo, supra note 8.
Clay v. Riddle, supra note 7, at 460 (dissenting opinion).
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charged with serious crimes is hard to justify.

'76

It is, this

writer submits, impossible to justify.
BARBARA CASE COCKREHAM

76.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFPRCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
CHALLENGE OF A FREE SOCIETY

THE

OF JUSTICE.

129 (1967).
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